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104 
Note 
DICKEY v. STATE: JURY INSTRUCTION ON DRUG USE AND ITS 
CONCOMITANT EFFECT ON EYEWITNESS CREDIBILITY 
RACHEL M. WITRIOL  
In Dickey v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered 
whether a trial court is obliged to give a requested jury instruction on the 
credibility of testimony given by a witness who is addicted to drugs or was 
abusing drugs at the time of the alleged crime.2  The Court of Appeals held 
that the subject matter of the requested instruction had already been 
addressed by other instructions given to the jury, and that the requested 
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law because it called for 
examination of addict-witness testimony under a heightened standard of 
scrutiny.3  The court‘s holding resulted from its misapplication of the three-
part test based on Maryland Rule 4-325, under which a trial court must 
consider several factors in assessing whether it must give a requested 
instruction to the jury.4  The court also neglected to address the specific 
facts of the Dickey case in its analysis of addict-informant instructions.5  
Although the court properly affirmed Dickey‘s conviction, its holding left 
an unclear rule that appears to give trial courts broad discretion to deny 
requests for addict-witness instructions when in fact certain circumstances 
should require a trial judge to instruct the jury on a witness‘s relationship 
with drugs and the effect of drug use on credibility.6   
 
Copyright © 2009 by Rachel M. Witriol. 
 Rachel M. Witriol is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of 
Law where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  She is greatly appreciative to 
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and Comments Editor, for their support, guidance, and encouragement throughout the writing 
process.  The author would also like to thank Professor Abraham Dash for the wisdom and insight 
he imparted from his experience in the field of criminal law. 
 1. 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449. 
 3. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452. 
 4. See infra Part IV.A. 
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Witriol.pdf 
2009] DICKEY v. STATE 105 
I.  THE CASE 
Petitioner Desmond Ellison Dickey was charged with first degree 
murder and other related felonies in connection with a fatal shooting that 
occurred on August 12, 2001, in Baltimore, Maryland.7  Anthony Carlest 
was killed in the shooting and Carlest‘s cousin, Melvin McCallister, was 
wounded.8  Four eyewitnesses, including McCallister, identified Dickey as 
the shooter.9  Dickey was subsequently charged in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore City.10   
During Dickey‘s trial, eyewitness Earl Price admitted to having a 
history of drug abuse, that he was currently addicted to heroin, and that he 
occasionally used cocaine.11  He also stated that he had used heroin on the 
day of the shooting, but asserted that the drug use did not affect his ability 
to perceive and recall the events to which he testified.12  Price further 
testified that police told him they would drop the drug possession charges 
stemming from his arrest on October 4, 2001, in exchange for his testimony 
at Dickey‘s trial.13   
After the conclusion of the evidence, Dickey requested a jury 
instruction stating that the testimony of a witness who either used drugs or 
was addicted to drugs ―must be examined with greater scrutiny than the 
testimony of any other witness.‖14  The circuit court denied the request, 
reasoning that the issue had already been dealt with during Price‘s cross-
examination regarding his drug abuse problems and his ability to remember 
the events, as well as by other jury instructions given regarding witness 
credibility and accuracy of witnesses‘ recollection.15  The jury later 
 
 7. Dickey, 404 Md. at 189, 195, 946 A.2d at 445, 449. 
 8. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445.  The shooting was apparently the result of a dispute between 
McCallister and Dickey‘s cousin, Juan Tucker.  Id., 946 A.2d at 446. 
 9. Id. at 189–91, 946 A.2d at 446.  McCallister identified Dickey as the shooter out of a 
police line-up.  Id. at 190, 946 A.2d at 446.  Anna Boxer also identified Dickey as the shooter, and 
testified that he was the driver of the white Caravan involved in the shooting.  Id.  William 
McLain witnessed the shooting and wrote down the license plate number of the van in which he 
saw the shooter leave the scene, which was registered to Dickey.  Id. at 190–91, 946 A.2d at 446.  
Earl Price, a long-time acquaintance of Tucker and Dickey, testified that Dickey was the shooter, 
and that after the shooting ended he saw Dickey and Tucker get into a white car together.  Id. at 
191, 946 A.2d at 446–47.  
 10. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445. 
 11. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447. 
 12. Id.   
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 193, 946 A.2d at 447.  This jury instruction is derived from the Modern Federal Jury 
Instructions.  Id. at 193 n.2, 946 A.2d at 447 n.2 (citing 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN 
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 7-91 (2006)).   
 15. Id. at 193–94, 946 A.2d at 448. 
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returned a verdict of guilty on all counts and Dickey was sentenced to life 
plus thirty years imprisonment.16 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Dickey‘s 
conviction.17  The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred by 
refusing to give the requested instruction.18  The court reasoned that Price‘s 
testimony regarding his drug use and addiction entitled Dickey to a 
specialized instruction as a matter of law.19  However, the Court of Special 
Appeals found the error was harmless due to the abundance of other 
evidence connecting Dickey to the shooting, as well as the jury‘s 
knowledge of Price‘s drug use and addiction from his testimony on direct 
and cross-examination.20  Thus, the court affirmed Dickey‘s conviction.21   
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether 
the circuit court erred by denying Dickey‘s request for a jury instruction 
requiring heightened scrutiny of drug-addict witness testimony and, if so, 
whether such an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.22 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Maryland Rule 4-325 governs whether a trial court is required to give 
a requested jury instruction in a criminal trial.23  The Maryland Court of 
Appeals has devised a three-part test interpreting Rule 4-325.24  The 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the only Maryland appellate court to 
have addressed jury instructions on drug-addict witness testimony prior to 
Dickey, requires a trial judge to grant a request for a specific jury instruction 
addressing a witness‘s relationship with drugs and its effect on that 
witness‘s testimony.25  Maryland law is more settled on what jury 
instruction a trial court must give in the case of testimony by accomplice 
witnesses or witnesses promised a benefit for testifying: The Maryland 
Court of Appeals requires a trial court to instruct jurors tasked with 
determining the credibility of such witnesses to consider their testimony 
―with caution.‖26   
 
 16. Id. at 195, 946 A.2d at 449. 
 17. Dickey v. State, No. 1184, slip op. at 32 (Md. App. Feb. 21, 2007). 
 18. Id. at 12. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 12, 15. 
 21. Id. at 32.  The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court after 
vacating Dickey‘s sentence for unrelated reasons.  Id. at 27. 
 22. Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 196, 946 A.2d 444, 449 (2008). 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See infra Part II.C. 
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A.  Based on Maryland Rule 4-325, the Court has Devised a Three-
Part Test for Determining Whether a Trial Judge is Required to 
Give a Requested Instruction  
Maryland Rule 4-325 governs whether a trial judge must give a 
requested jury instruction during a criminal trial.27  Specifically, Maryland 
Rule 4-325(c) states: ―The court may, and at the request of any party shall, 
instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the 
instructions are binding . . . .  The court need not grant a requested 
instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.‖28  
The Maryland Court of Appeals has interpreted this rule to require the court 
to give an instruction when it meets three pre-conditions: (1) it is a correct 
statement of the law, (2) it is applicable to the facts of the case, and (3) it is 
not covered by other jury instructions.29 
The court has long asserted the principle that a trial judge is not 
required to give a requested instruction as long as other instructions given 
to the jury ―‗fairly cover‘ the subject matter of the requested instruction.‖30  
In Gunning v. State,31 the court granted certiorari in two cases, both 
involving a defendant convicted based on a single eyewitness‘s 
uncorroborated identification.32  In both cases, the defense was mistaken 
identification, and both defendants requested a jury instruction on 
eyewitness identification, which the trial judge refused to give to the jury.33  
The court emphasized that a trial judge has discretion when deciding 
whether to give a requested instruction, but that failure to exercise such 
discretion is considered error.34  In each case, the court found the trial judge 
failed to exercise his discretion by denying the requested instruction based 
on an incorrect assumption that identification instructions are per se 
inappropriate.35  The court explained that a trial judge properly exercises 
judicial discretion by making an individualized determination—based on 
the facts and evidence—of whether the requested instruction is necessary, 
and whether other instructions ―fairly cover‖ the subject matter of the 
requested instruction.36 
 
 27. MD. R. 4-325. 
 28. Id. 4-325(c). 
 29. See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text. 
 30. Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 348, 701 A.2d 374, 382 (1997); Grandison v. State, 341 
Md. 175, 211, 670 A.2d 398, 415 (1995); England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 276, 334 A.2d 98, 105 
(1975). 
 31. 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374. 
 32. Id. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 345, 348, 352, 701 A.2d at 380, 383–84. 
 35. Id. at 351, 701 A.2d at 383.   
 36. Id. at 353, 701 A.2d at 384. 
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This inquiry is articulated in both Patterson v. State37 and Thompson 
v. State.38  In both cases, the Court of Appeals noted that it has consistently 
interpreted Maryland Rule 4-325(c) to oblige a trial judge to give a party‘s 
requested instruction where the instruction is ―(1) a correct statement of the 
law; (2) applicable under the facts of the case;‖ and where ―(3) the content 
of the requested instruction [is] not fairly covered elsewhere‖ in the 
instructions actually given to the jury.39  In Patterson, the defendant was 
convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute based on 
evidence that cocaine was found inside a jacket located in the trunk of his 
car.40  The defendant‘s defense at trial was that the jacket did not belong to 
him.41  The prosecution entered only a picture of the jacket into evidence at 
trial because law enforcement had lost the jacket.42  The defendant 
requested a ―missing evidence‖ instruction at trial, stating that the jury 
could infer that the prosecution did not offer the jacket into evidence 
because the jacket was exculpatory.43  The court found the trial judge was 
not required to give the instruction, in part because there was no evidence 
that law enforcement intentionally destroyed the jacket or that the jacket 
was exculpatory.44 
In Thompson, the defendant was convicted of assault, reckless 
endangerment, and several firearms offenses.45  Evidence adduced at trial 
showed that the defendant attempted to flee on his bicycle when he was 
approached by a detective.46  The trial court granted the State‘s request for 
a flight instruction over defense counsel‘s objection.47  The Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the flight 
instruction because the facts showed that the defendant did not flee from the 
detective due to a guilty conscience relating to the crimes he was charged 
with at trial.48  In both Patterson and Thompson, the court acknowledged 
 
 37. 356 Md. 677, 683–84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999). 
 38. 393 Md. 291, 302–03, 901 A.2d 208, 214 (2006). 
 39. Thompson, 393 Md. at 302–03, 901 A.2d at 214; Patterson, 356 Md. at 683–84, 741 A.2d 
at 1122 (citing Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58, 702 A.2d 699, 718 (1997)); see also MD. R. 4-325. 
 40. Patterson, 356 Md. at 680–81, 741 A.2d at 1120–21. 
 41. Id. at 682, 741 A.2d at 1121.   
 42. Id. at 681–82, 741 A.2d at 1121. 
 43. Id. at 682, 741 A.2d at 1121. 
 44. Id. at 697–99, 741 A.2d at 1129–30. 
 45. Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 300, 901 A.2d 208, 213 (2006). 
 46. Id. at 295, 901 A.2d at 210. 
 47. Id. at 298–300, 901 A.2d at 212–13. 
 48. Id. at 313–15, 901 A.2d at 221–22.  In fact, the defendant admitted to police that he fled 
from the detective because he had drugs in his possession.  Id. at 313, 901 A.2d at 221.  The 
defendant was not being tried for drug possession, so this fact was not admitted into evidence at 
trial.  Id. at 314, 901 A.2d at 221.  The court found that the defendant may have been prejudiced 
by the flight instruction, and thus the trial judge abused his discretion.  Id. at 315, 901 A.2d at 222. 
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the importance of the three-prong test in the trial court‘s determination of 
whether to give the requested instruction.49 
At the same time, the Court of Appeals has also consistently asserted a 
rule that is seemingly incompatible with the three-prong test.50  In General 
v. State,51 the Court of Appeals reiterated the rule that ―[w]hether a 
particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any 
evidence in the case that supports the instruction.‖52  This rule is often 
incompatible with the three-prong test because it presents a different 
standard for whether a trial judge must give a requested instruction.  In 
General, the defendant was charged with and convicted of a hit and run.53  
At trial, his defense was that he believed he struck a trash bag, not a 
person.54  He requested a specific jury instruction regarding the defense of 
mistake of fact, but the trial court denied the request, giving only 
knowledge and proof of intent instructions to the jury.55  The Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that ―[t]he knowledge and intent instructions, 
while sufficiently informing the jury of the required mental element, did not 
expressly direct the jury‘s attention to the defense of mistake of fact.‖56  
The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to the instruction 
because there was evidence that he believed he struck a bag, not a person.57   
Thus, under this alternative rule articulated in General, if there is some 
evidence that generates a requested instruction, the trial court is required to 
give that instruction.58  In determining whether sufficient evidence exists to 
generate an instruction under this rule, the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant.59  This rule is seemingly incompatible with 
the three-prong test, under which a trial judge is not required to give a 
 
 49. Thompson, 393 Md. at 302, 901 A.2d at 214; Patterson, 356 Md. at 683–84, 741 A.2d at 
1122.  
 50. See, e.g., General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002) 
(―Whether a particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in 
the case that supports the instruction.‖); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 582, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 
(1991) (―[A] defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly 
supported by the evidence.‖); Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97, 145 A.2d 428, 433 (1958) (―It is 
incumbent upon the court . . . when requested in a criminal case, to give an advisory instruction on 
every essential question or point of law supported by the evidence.‖).  
 51. 367 Md. 475, 789 A.2d 102.   
 52. Id. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09. 
 53. Id. at 478–79, 789 A.2d at 104. 
 54. Id. at 483, 789 A.2d at 106. 
 55. Id. at 480–81, 789 A.2d at 105.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that there 
was no error because the requested instruction was ―fairly covered‖ by the general intent 
instruction given to the jury.  Id. at 482–83, 789 A.2d at 106. 
 56. Id. at 490, 789 A.2d at 111. 
 57. Id. at 488, 490, 789 A.2d at 109, 111. 
 58. Id. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09. 
 59. Id. at 487, 789 A.2d at 109. 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Witriol.pdf 
110 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 68:104 
requested instruction if other instructions cover the subject matter of the 
requested instruction.60  
B.  The Maryland Court of Special Appeals Requires a Trial Court to 
Give a Drug-Addict Witness Instruction on Credibility, While 
Federal Courts Sometimes Require Addict-Informant Instructions   
In Allen v. State,61 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals first 
examined the issue of whether a trial judge is required to give a specific 
jury instruction related to drug-addict witness testimony.62  Defendant 
William Allen, a dentist, was convicted of solicitation to commit murder for 
soliciting an undercover police officer to murder a Deputy State‘s 
Attorney.63  Allen apparently held a grudge against Deputy State‘s Attorney 
Barry Levine after Levine brought charges against him for drug related 
offenses, to which Allen later pled guilty.64  At trial, Allen‘s friend, Larry 
Westwood, testified that Allen confided in him that he wanted to kill 
Levine.65  Westwood admitted during his testimony that he abused drugs, 
including valium and triazolam (a drug used to treat insomnia), and used 
cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana.66  Allen requested a jury instruction 
regarding Westwood‘s drug use, but the trial court denied the request.67 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court must 
give an instruction on drug use and addiction when evidence of a witness‘s 
drug addiction or drug abuse is ―abundant.‖68  The Court of Special 
Appeals reasoned that the trial court‘s general instructions on witness 
credibility did not cover the specific circumstances surrounding the 
testimony of such a witness.69  The Allen court found that the trial court 
committed error by not giving the requested instruction regarding drug use 
and its ―concomitant effect on [witness] credibility.‖70  The Court of 
Special Appeals, however, ultimately held that the trial court‘s error was 
harmless due to the combination of the jury‘s awareness of the witness‘s 
drug abuse and addiction that came out during his testimony and the general 
 
 60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 61. 91 Md. App. 705, 605 A.2d 960 (1992). 
 62. Id. at 709, 605 A.2d at 962.     
 63. Id. at 707–08, 605 A.2d at 961.   
 64. Id. at 709–11, 605 A.2d at 962–63.    
 65. Id. at 712–13, 605 A.2d at 963–64. 
 66. Id. at 711 n.4, 605 A.2d at 963 n.4. 
 67. Id. at 739, 605 A.2d at 977. 
 68. Id. at 742, 744, 605 A.2d at 978–79. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 742, 745, 605 A.2d at 978, 979. 
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instruction the jury received on witness credibility.71  The Maryland Court 
of Appeals denied certiorari.72 
Maryland courts often look to the federal courts when Maryland case 
law provides little direction on a particular issue.  While most federal courts 
have not directly addressed drug-addict witness instructions, many have 
dealt with a similar issue: the addict-informant instruction.73  Federal circuit 
courts are split on whether it constitutes error to refuse to give an addict-
informant instruction.74   
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Kinnard75 and the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Griffin76 both held that a 
trial court‘s refusal to give an addict-informant instruction may constitute 
error depending on the circumstances.77  In Kinnard, defendants Darnell 
Kinnard and Mahlon Payne were both convicted of drug possession, failure 
to pay taxes, and sale of heroin for their involvement in a drug transaction 
arranged by a government informant who was a known drug user.78  The 
D.C. Circuit reversed and held that when such a witness testifies, the trial 
court must instruct the jury to consider the testimony with ―extreme 
caution‖ if it is uncorroborated in any material way, because addict-
informants have a motive to fabricate the truth.79 
In Griffin, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully receiving and 
concealing narcotic drugs, and buying and selling narcotic drugs.80  The 
government‘s informant for the case was an admitted drug addict, but the 
trial court failed to give an addict-informant instruction.81  The Sixth 
Circuit reversed the conviction and held that Griffin had a right to have the 
jury instructed to carefully evaluate the addict-informant‘s credibility.82 
 
 71. Id. at 745, 605 A.2d at 979. 
 72. Allen v. State, 327 Md. 625, 612 A.2d 256 (1992). 
 73. 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL ¶ 
7.01[3], at 7-55, 7-56 (2008). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 465 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 76. 382 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1967). 
 77. Kinnard, 465 F.2d at 569 (holding that an addict-informant instruction is required if 
requested); Griffin, 382 F.2d at 829 (holding that an instruction is required if an addict-informant 
witness‘s testimony is the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crime).  In subsequent 
Sixth Circuit cases in which a drug-addicted witness was not also an informant, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a drug-addict instruction is not required per se.  United States v. Warner, 955 F.2d 441, 
455 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 946 F.2d 1191, 1194–95 (6th Cir. 1991).   
 78. Kinnard, 465 F.2d at 568. 
 79. Id. at 572. 
 80. Griffin, 382 F.2d at 824. 
 81. Id. at 828–29. 
 82. Id. at 829. 
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However, these cases are more the exception than the rule.  The 
majority of federal courts have found no reversible error for a trial court‘s 
refusal to give an addict-informant instruction because reliability issues are 
sufficiently highlighted during witness testimony, by other instructions 
given to the jury, or both.83  Among these is the Seventh Circuit, which 
held in United States v. Rodgers
84
 that it was not error to deny an addict-
informant instruction where the defendant‘s main concern was the witness‘s 
―ability to perceive and relate the truth‖ rather than the risk that the addict-
informant witness would lie on the stand.85  
C.  Maryland Courts Have Long Treated with Apprehension the 
Testimony of Accomplice Witnesses and Witnesses Promised a 
Benefit for Testifying 
For nearly 100 years, Maryland courts have recognized the necessity 
of a specific jury instruction advising jurors to consider ―with caution‖ the 
testimony of accomplice witnesses and witnesses promised a benefit for 
testifying.  In 1911, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Luery v. State86 
that testimony of an accomplice witness is ―universally received with 
caution‖ and should be ―weighed and scrutinized with great care.‖87  The 
defendant in Luery, a junk dealer, was convicted of receiving stolen 
 
 83. See United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549–50 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the trial 
court did not err by denying an addict-informant instruction where the concern was witness 
perception, not risk of perjury).  See also Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 882–83 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the trial court did not err by rejecting addict-informant instruction where no evidence 
of the witness‘s addiction was introduced during trial); United States v. Bryan, 122 F.3d 90, 92 
(2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a refusal to give an addict-informant instruction did not prejudice the 
defendant‘s substantial rights); United States v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 
that an addict-informant instruction was not required absent evidence that the witness used drugs 
during the events testified to, and because the informant was cross-examined regarding his drug 
use and the jury received other relevant instructions); United States v. Yarbough, 55 F.3d 280, 
283–85 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an addict-
informant instruction); United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1577–79 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(finding that the trial court did not err by failing to give an addict-informant instruction when the 
court provided ample jury instructions on the informant‘s credibility); United States v. Williams, 
809 F.2d 75, 87 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no per se rule for giving addict-informant 
instructions); United States v. Smith, 692 F.2d 658, 660–61 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court‘s refusal to give an addict-informant instruction); 
United States v. Hoppe, 645 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the trial court did not err 
by refusing to provide an instruction where informant‘s drug-addiction was disputed); United 
States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1261–63 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that the trial court did not err 
by denying a request for an addict instruction); Gov‘t of Virgin Islands v. Hendricks, 476 F.2d 
776, 779–80 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that the trial court did not err by not giving an instruction 
regarding the reliability of an addict-informant). 
 84. 755 F.2d 533. 
 85. Id. at 549–50. 
 86. 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911). 
 87. Id. at 292, 81 A. at 684. 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Witriol.pdf 
2009] DICKEY v. STATE 113 
goods.88  An employee of the United Railways & Electric Company of 
Baltimore admitted to stealing the goods from his employer, pled guilty to 
larceny, and testified as an accomplice against the defendant.89  While the 
court affirmed the defendant‘s conviction, it did so by formulating the rule 
that a conviction based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony 
should be disallowed.90   
Brown v. State91 reaffirmed the rule first established in Luery requiring 
corroboration of accomplice testimony to sustain a conviction.92  In Brown, 
the defendant was convicted of second degree murder based on 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness.93  Even though an 
instruction cautioning the jury to examine accomplice witness testimony 
―with care and [to] view[] [it] with suspicion‖ was not at issue in Brown, 
the Maryland Court of Appeals nonetheless recognized that such an 
instruction accomplished a similar purpose to that of the Luery rule.94  The 
court affirmed the conviction on the basis that the ―accomplice‘s testimony 
was adequately corroborated.‖95  
The Court of Appeals again affirmed in 2004 use of the ―with caution‖ 
standard in Archer v. State.96  The defendant in Archer was convicted of 
felony murder and attempted murder.97  A witness to the murder pled guilty 
for his involvement in the crime and testified at trial on the State‘s behalf in 
exchange for leniency.98  On appeal, the Court of Appeals approved of the 
trial court‘s specific instruction to the jury regarding a witness who was 
promised a benefit in exchange for his testimony.99  The instruction stated 
that such testimony ―should [be] consider[ed] . . . with caution.‖100  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals has consistently recognized that the 
testimony of accomplice witnesses or witnesses who are promised a benefit 
for their testimony should be treated with apprehension. 
 
 88. Id. at 285, 81 A. at 681. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 292–95, 81 A. at 684–85. 
 91. 281 Md. 241, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977). 
 92. Id. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108. 
 93. Id. at 241–42, 378 A.2d at 1105. 
 94. Id. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108. 
 95. Id.  
 96. 383 Md. 329, 859 A.2d 210 (2004). 
 97. Id. at 335, 859 A.2d at 214. 
 98. Id. at 371–72 n.4, 859 A.2d at 235–36 n.4. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In Dickey v. State,101 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
Desmond Ellison Dickey‘s conviction and held that the trial court did not 
err by refusing to give the defendant‘s requested jury instruction regarding 
the credibility of drug-using or drug-addicted witnesses.102  In doing so, the 
court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but gave different 
justifications than the Court of Special Appeals for its affirmation.103  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the three-prong test originating 
from Maryland Rule 4-325, which governs criminal jury instructions.104  In 
applying the test, the court found that the trial court was not required to give 
the requested instruction because it did not meet two of the three 
conditions.105  While it noted that the requested instruction was applicable 
to the facts of the case, the court found that the instruction did not correctly 
state the law and other jury instructions ―fairly covered‖ the issue.106 
The court reasoned that an instruction that the jury should scrutinize a 
drug-abusing or drug-addicted witness‘s testimony ―with more caution‖ 
than other witnesses and ―with greater scrutiny‖ was not a correct statement 
of Maryland law.107  The court pointed out that the scrutiny standard for 
instructions regarding testimony of a witness who has a motive to lie is 
―merely ‗with caution,‘‖ and does not require an elevated standard of 
scrutiny.108  According to the court, there was no case law to support 
Dickey‘s assertion that the testimony of a drug-abusing or drug-addicted 
witness required more scrutiny than that of a witness who is promised a 
benefit in exchange for testimony, or of a witness with any kind of 
 
 101. Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (2008).   
 102. Id. at 189, 946 A.2d at 445. 
 103. Id.  While the Court of Special Appeals found that the trial court committed error by not 
giving the specific instruction, it affirmed the conviction because it found the error was harmless.  
Id. at 189 n.1, 946 A.2d at 445 n.1.  The Court of Appeals did not find that the trial court erred at 
all.  Id.  
 104. Id. at 197–98, 946 A.2d at 450; see also MD. R. 4-325.  The test requires that a trial court 
give a requested instruction when three conditions are met:  ―(1) the instruction is a correct 
statement of the law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of 
the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions actually given.‖  Dickey, 404 Md. 
at 197–98, 946 A.2d at 450 (citing Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302–03, 901 A.2d 208, 214 
(2006); Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 683–84, 741 A.2d 1119, 1122 (1999)). 
 105. Dickey, 404 Md. at 199, 946 A.2d at 451. 
 106. Id. at 199 & n.6, 946 A.2d at 451 & n.6. 
 107. Id. at 200, 946 A.2d at 452. 
 108. Id. 
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problematic perception issues.109  As a result, the court concluded that the 
requested instruction was an incorrect statement of law.110 
The court also found that the requested instruction was already 
covered by other instructions given to the jury.111  The court reasoned that 
precedent dictated careful consideration of a defendant‘s request for a jury 
instruction regarding eyewitness testimony unless other instructions given 
similarly guided the jury.112  Under this standard, whether other instructions 
sufficed was a question for the trial court and, as long as the judge 
considered whether the requested instruction had already been sufficiently 
addressed, it was not error for the judge to deny the request.113  Here, the 
court found that the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion in 
deciding not to give the requested instruction.114   
The court further agreed with the trial court that the instructions given 
regarding the credibility of witnesses115 and the identification of the 
defendant116 sufficiently covered the issue of a drug-addicted or drug-
abusing witness‘s ability to perceive and recall events.117  The court found 
that these instructions, in addition to Price‘s testimony and Dickey‘s ability 
to raise the issue of Price‘s drug use and addiction during closing 
arguments, gave the jury ―ample guidance . . . to make credibility 
assessments.‖118  Thus, the court found that the issues raised in Dickey‘s 
requested jury instruction were ―fairly covered‖ by other instructions given 
by the trial court.119  In so finding, the court concluded that two of the three 
conditions of the three-prong test were not met, and therefore the trial court 
was not required to give the requested instruction.120 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452.  The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to 
give the instruction at all, and that if it had given the instruction, the trial court itself may have 
committed error.  Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 201–02, 946 A.2d at 452–53 (citing Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 354–55, 701 
A.2d 374, 385 (1997)).  The court further noted that eyewitness identification instructions were 
not required per se.  Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452. 
 113. Id. at 202 & n.7, 946 A.2d at 453 & n.7. 
 114. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454. 
 115. The instruction used is found in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:10.  Id. at 
202, 946 A.2d at 453.  
 116. The instruction used is found in Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:30.  Id.  
 117. Id. at 201, 946 A.2d at 452.   
 118. Id. at 203, 946 A.2d at 453–54. 
 119. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454. 
 120. Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Dickey v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland improperly 
affirmed the trial court‘s denial of Dickey‘s request for a special jury 
instruction on drug-addicted and drug-abusing witnesses.121  In doing so the 
court misapplied Maryland‘s established three-prong test to hold that the 
requested instruction was fairly covered by other instructions given and that 
it was an incorrect statement of law.122  When applying the three-prong test, 
the court should have instead substituted its own ―with caution‖ standard in 
the requested instruction, rather than rejecting the instruction altogether.123  
The court should also have discussed the significance of Earl Price‘s status 
as a drug-addict and as a witness promised a benefit for testifying in its 
analysis of addict-informant instructions.124  Finally, the court should have 
explicitly approved use of a specific instruction regarding drug-addict 
witness testimony that incorporates the ―with caution‖ standard, particularly 
where such a witness is the sole eyewitness to an alleged crime with little 
corroborating evidence.125   
A.  The Court Misapplied the Three-Prong Test  
The court failed to correctly apply Maryland‘s three-prong test in two 
ways.  First, in holding that the trial court‘s general jury instructions ―fairly 
covered‖ the subject matter of the requested instruction, the court did not 
consider the special circumstances that drug-addict witness testimony 
presents.126  Second, the court should have substituted the ―with caution‖ 
standard to modify the proposed instruction so that it would have met the 
court‘s three-part test.127   
The trial court‘s general jury instructions in Dickey did not ―fairly 
cover‖ the subject matter of the requested instruction regarding drug-addict 
 
 121. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 122. See infra Part IV.A. 
 123. See infra Part IV.A. 
 124. See infra Part IV.B. 
 125. See infra Part IV.C. 
 126. See Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 705, 742, 605 A.2d 960, 978, cert. denied, 327 Md. 625, 
612 A.2d 256 (1992) (noting that drug-addict witness testimony presents the specific issue, not 
covered by a general witness credibility instruction, of the ―concomitant effect‖ that a witness‘s 
relationship with drugs has on his credibility). 
 127. See Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 207, 946 A.2d 444, 456 (2008) (―[H]ad counsel 
submitted a properly worded instruction advising the jury that if the jury found that Price was 
addicted to drugs and had been using drugs during the relevant time in question, the jury should 
consider Price‘s testimony with care and caution, it would have been within the court‘s discretion 
to give the instruction and would not have been error.‖).  See also infra notes 135–136 and 
accompanying text.  
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witness testimony.128  General witness credibility issues raised in Maryland 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 3:10, 3:13, and 3:30, the source of the 
instructions given by the trial court, do not encourage a jury to consider 
such matters as the ―concomitant effect‖ drugs have on a witness‘s 
credibility.129  Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals in Allen found that a 
general jury instruction given regarding witness credibility did not address 
the particular circumstance of the witness‘s ―relationship with drugs and the 
concomitant effect on his credibility as a witness.‖130  Similarly in Dickey, 
Earl Price‘s relationship with drugs likely affected his credibility as a 
witness to the shooting.131  Even the court in Dickey recognized that the 
rationale behind a specific drug-addict instruction is to alert the jury that 
drug abuse may have had ―perceptual effects‖ on a witness‘s capacity to 
accurately observe and relay what occurred.132  In doing so, the court itself 
acknowledged the difference between the subject matter of general jury 
instructions on witness credibility and a ―witness using or addicted to 
drugs‖133 instruction.  While they are somewhat similar, the two subjects 
are distinct enough to warrant a specialized jury instruction.134   
 
 128. Cf. General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 490, 789 A.2d 102, 111 (2002) (holding that general 
knowledge and intent instructions did not fairly cover a requested instruction on the mistake of 
fact defense that was generated by evidence).  Compare Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at 
978 (holding that the trial court erred by failing to give a specific instruction regarding a State‘s 
witness‘s status as a drug abuser), with England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 276, 334 A.2d 98, 105 
(1975) (holding that the trial court was not required to give a general instruction regarding 
identification because it was fairly covered by instructions given on burden of proof and weighing 
of evidence).  See also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 3–10, Dickey, 
404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23) (arguing that other instructions given did not specifically 
address the witness‘s ability to perceive and relate the events and that the enumerated factors of 
the instructions given misled the jury away from considering Price‘s drug use and its effect on his 
testimony). 
 129. Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions §§ 3:10, 3:13, 3:30 (2007). 
 130. Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at 978. 
 131. See id. (finding the witness‘s relationship with drugs had a ―concomitant effect on his 
credibility as a witness‖).  See also Bernie R. Burrus & Harry L. Marks, Testimonial Reliability of 
Drug Addicts, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 259 (1960) (―[E]ven the temporary presence of drugs 
affects the functioning of the body‘s organs, and thus bears directly on the credibility of the 
witness‘ testimony.‖); 28A C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 408 (2008) (―[T]he addiction of the 
addict must be considered as having an important bearing on his or her credibility.‖);  81 AM. JUR. 
2D Witnesses § 840 (2008) (stating that drug use affects ―the ability of the witness to perceive, 
recall, or relate . . . the event about which he is testifying if under drug influence at that time‖). 
 132. Dickey, 404 Md. at 205, 946 A.2d at 454. 
 133. Id. at 203, 946 A.2d at 454 (―The purpose of the ‗Witness Using or Addicted to Drugs‘ 
instruction is to direct the jury‘s attention to the potential perceptual effects drug use or addiction 
might have on a witness‘s ability to observe and relate events in the witness‘s testimony . . . .‖). 
 134. See, e.g., 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CRIMINAL ¶ 7-91 (2008).  See also Allen, 91 Md. App. at 742, 605 A.2d at 978 (finding that a 
general witness credibility instruction did not adequately address a witness‘s ―relationship with 
drugs and the concomitant effect on his credibility as a witness‖).  The comments to the Modern 
Federal Jury Instructions discuss the distinction between the general witness credibility instruction 
and the addict instruction: ―[T]he rationale for the addict instruction is different from [other 
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Second, instead of flatly rejecting the requested jury instruction, the 
court should have substituted its own ―with caution‖ standard in the 
requested instruction to allow the instruction to meet the court‘s three-prong 
test.  The court correctly asserted that a ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ is 
an incorrect statement of Maryland law.135  As the court acknowledged, 
however, the trial court may substitute its own language to correct a jury 
instruction that erroneously states the law.136  Therefore, after the court 
determined that the ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ was an incorrect 
statement of Maryland law, it should have used its own ―with caution‖ 
standard when conducting the requisite three-part analysis under Maryland 
Rule 4-325.137  By reworking the requested instruction into a correct 
statement of law,138 the court would have corrected the instruction‘s 
statement of the law to enable the trial court to fulfill its obligation to 
 
instructions that] . . . go to the credibility of the witness, addiction itself relates primarily to the 
ability of the witness to perceive and relate observed events.  It does not necessarily reflect on the 
truthfulness of the witness.‖  Id.  Dickey also makes this point in his reply brief, stating that ―the 
language of the [credibility] instruction, however broad it may be, cannot be read to cover 
perceptual impairment as a result of drug use or addiction.‖  Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and 
Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 6, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23). 
 135. Dickey, 404 Md. at 200–01, 946 A.2d at 452.  See also Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 
371–72 n.4, 859 A.2d 210, 235–36 n.4 (2004) (approving the court‘s use of the ―with caution‖ 
standard for instructing the jury on testimony of a witness promised a benefit); Brown v. State, 
281 Md. 241, 246, 378 A.2d 1104, 1106–07 (1977) (stating that Maryland has traditionally used 
the ―with caution‖ standard for accomplice testimony instructions); Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 
292, 81 A. 681, 684 (1911) (―[T]he evidence of an accomplice is universally received with caution 
and weighed and scrutinized with great care.‖).  The court bolstered its argument that a ―with 
caution‖ standard is more appropriate than the ―heightened standard of scrutiny‖ by citing to 
criminal pattern jury instructions from Mississippi, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, without 
acknowledging that the requested instruction in Dickey came directly from a federal pattern jury 
instruction.  Dickey, 404 Md. at 193 n.2, 200–01, 946 A.2d at 447 n.2, 452. 
 136. Dickey, 404 Md. at 198 n.5, 946 A.2d at 450 n.5 (―[W]here a requested instruction is 
technically erroneous, but the subject is one in which the court is required to give an instruction, it 
is the duty of the trial court to include a correct instruction.‖ (citing Noel v. State, 202 Md. 247, 
252, 96 A.2d 7, 10 (1953); Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App. 331, 337, 367 A.2d 90, 94 (1976))).   
 137. See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 350, 701 A.2d 374, 382–83 (1997) (―[A] trial judge is 
under no obligation to use the precise language suggested by counsel in submitting an 
instruction . . . [the trial court] is not preclude[d] . . . from fashioning its own instruction, provided 
that the judicially-crafted instruction is accurate and ‗fairly covers‘ the requested instruction.‖); 
see also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 12, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946 
A.2d 444 (No. 23) (―[I]f the court in the present case objected to the ‗greater scrutiny‘ language in 
the requested instruction, it easily could have removed that language or substituted it with . . . a 
sentence directing the jury to examine the testimony of a witness who uses or is addicted to drugs 
‗with caution.‘‖).  Instead of properly making the focal issue of its opinion a specific instruction 
regarding drug-addict/user witness testimony, the court focused on the over-arching language of 
the instruction put forth by Dickey.  Dickey, 404 Md. at 200, 946 A.2d at 452.  
 138. See Dickey, 404 Md. at 200–01, 946 A.2d at 452 (disapproving of the heightened standard 
of scrutiny in the requested instruction and finding it was an incorrect statement of law). 
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instruct the jury on the issue of Price‘s drug addiction because there was 
sufficient evidence to support the requested instruction.139   
B.  The Court Failed to Recognize the Particular Applicability of its 
Addict-Informant Analysis to the Facts of Dickey   
The Dickey court explained in its opinion that issues involving the 
testimony of witnesses who are addicted to or using drugs most often arise 
in the context of witnesses who are both addicts and informants.140  In its 
analysis, the court failed to discuss the pertinent facts surrounding Dickey‘s 
trial—mainly that Price was similarly situated as a witness.141  Though not 
an informant, Price was nevertheless promised a benefit for testifying.142  
An analysis of these facts may have led the court to find that a special 
instruction on drug addiction was particularly applicable in situations like 
this one, where a witness is not only an accomplice, informant, or has been 
promised a benefit for testifying, but is a drug-addict or was using drugs at 
the time he witnessed the alleged crime.   
The court itself understood the need for an instruction in such 
circumstances.  In fact, the court cited the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in 
United States v. Rodgers that addict-informant instructions stem from ―the 
concern that ‗addict-informants are subject to powerful temptations that 
create a serious risk that they will lie on the stand.‘‖143  However, the court 
did not address the fact that Price was offered a deal that may have tempted 
him to lie on the stand.144  Although Price‘s status as a witness who was 
 
 139. Cf. General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002) (―Whether a 
particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in the case that 
supports the instruction.‖). 
 140. Dickey, 404 Md. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454. 
 141. See id. at 192, 204–05, 946 A.2d at 447, 454 (―Price admitted that he was a heroin addict, 
an occasional cocaine user . . . that he had a long history of drug use . . . that he had used heroin 
on the day of the shooting . . . [and] that he was testifying at Dickey‘s trial as part of a deal to 
avoid charges following an arrest . . . .‖). 
 142. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447.  Price was offered a deal in which the state would drop 
charges related to his arrest for possession of controlled dangerous substances in exchange for his 
testimony against Dickey.  Id. 
 143. Id. at 204, 946 A.2d at 454 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549 (7th Cir. 
1985)).  See also Evan Haglund, Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 
1412–13 (1990) (arguing that informants have a proclivity to lie); Alexander Penelas, Note, 
Illinois v. Gates: Will Aguilar and Spinelli Rest in Peace?, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 875, 899 (1984) 
(―Informants are frequently themselves criminals, drug addicts, or liars who give information for 
reasons other than the call of civic duty.‖); Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors 
Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1383 (1996) (―Criminals are likely to say 
and do almost anything to get . . . out of trouble with the law.  This willingness to do anything 
includes . . . committing perjury.  A drug addict can sell out his mother to get a deal.‖). 
 144. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 201, 946 A.2d at 447, 452 (noting that ―Price stated repeatedly on 
the record that he was testifying at Dickey‘s trial as part of a deal to avoid charges,‖ but not 
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promised a benefit for testifying was not directly an issue on appeal, the 
court ignored an important fact by failing to incorporate the underlying 
facts of the case into its analysis.   
The court‘s failure to address the facts underlying Price‘s testimony is 
evidenced by its approval of the Rodgers view of drug addict or user jury 
instructions.145  The Rodgers court concluded that there was no error in 
refusing to give such an instruction because it ―reflected a concern with the 
witness‘s ability to perceive and relate the truth, not with a deliberate 
misstatement because of the desire to please the government.‖146  However 
in Dickey, due to Price‘s deal with the prosecutor, he may also have 
misrepresented his testimony as a result of his ―desire to please the 
government.‖147  Thus, had the court correctly acknowledged that Price was 
both an addict and a witness promised a benefit, its analysis could have 
more appropriately required the requested instruction in this case.  
C.  The Court Appears to Give Broad Discretion to Trial Courts When, 
Under Maryland Law, Certain Circumstances Require a Trial 
Judge to Give a Requested Instruction on Drug-Addict Witness 
Testimony 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Dickey‘s conviction because the trial 
court‘s failure to give the requested instruction did not constitute error.148  
While the court did not reach its second question, whether an error to refuse 
to give the requested instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt,149 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals properly found that the 
failure to give the instruction in Dickey was harmless.150  The abundance of 
other evidence, aside from Price‘s identification of Dickey as the shooter, 
was indeed sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict.151  However, the Dickey 
court did not clearly instruct lower courts about how to apply its 
decision.152  The court stated that it did not approve of the ―heightened 
 
discussing this fact in its analysis because ―the requested jury instruction [at issue] d[id] not deal 
with a motivation to lie‖). 
 145. Id. at 206, 946 A.2d at 455. 
 146. Id. (quoting Rodgers, 755 F.2d at 549).   
 147. Id. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447.  See also supra notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
 148. Dickey, 404 Md. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456. 
 149. Id. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449. 
 150. Id. at 189 n.1, 946 A.2d at 445 n.1. 
 151. Id. at 189–91, 946 A.2d at 446–47. 
 152. Id. at 199–207, 946 A.2d at 451–56.  The court discussed at length why the ―heightened 
standard of scrutiny‖ in the requested instruction was an incorrect statement of the law and may 
have constituted error had the instruction been given.  Id. at 199–201, 946 A.2d at 451–53.  It was 
only at the very end of the opinion, however, that the court briefly stated that if the requested 
instruction substituted the correct legal standard the instruction would have fallen within the trial 
court‘s discretion to give and would not have constituted error.  Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456.  
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standard of scrutiny‖ language in the requested instruction, and that an 
instruction utilizing a ―with caution‖ standard would have been 
acceptable.153  However, the court left it within the discretion of the trial 
court whether to give such an instruction to the jury.154   
The court should have more explicitly refused to completely overrule 
prior case law that had approved instructions on drug-addict witness 
credibility so long as those instructions incorporated the court‘s ―with care 
and caution‖ language.155  Rather, the court‘s opinion implies that any 
instructions on drug use or addiction are unnecessary and should not be 
used.156  The court‘s analysis, particularly when viewed together with 
Maryland precedent, creates ambiguity at the trial court level. 
The court further failed to consider that an instruction on drug use or 
addiction may be required under some circumstances, and cannot always be 
left within the discretion of the trial court.157  The court neglected to discuss 
the alternate rule that, in Maryland, a requested instruction is necessary if 
there is ―some evidence‖ to support it, and such evidence must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the accused.158  In Dickey, evidence regarding 
Price‘s drug use at the time he witnessed the shooting and his struggle with 
drug addiction during the time of his testimony at Dickey‘s trial adequately 
generated the requested instruction because such evidence supports 
Dickey‘s claim that Price‘s testimony might not have been credible.159  
Given the court‘s misapplication of the three-part test under Maryland Rule 
4-325, coupled with the evidence supporting Price‘s drug-addiction and use, 
the court should have recognized that a drug-addict witness instruction was 
necessary in this situation.160 
The court‘s failure to discuss the pertinent General rule has negative 
implications for future defendants.  Based on the Dickey court‘s opinion, a 
trial judge faced with a case involving the sole eyewitness to an alleged 
crime—a far more likely scenario than having four eyewitnesses—where 
 
 153. Id. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 110. 
 157. See, e.g., General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486–87, 789 A.2d 102, 108–09 (2002) 
(reasoning that a requested instruction must be given where there is ―any evidence in the case that 
supports the instruction,‖ and that the trial court is required to give a requested instruction when it 
is ―generated by the evidence‖); see also Cross-Respondent‘s Brief and Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 
3 n.1, Dickey, 404 Md. 187, 946 A.2d 444 (No. 23).    
 158. General, 367 Md. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09.   
 159. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 946 A.2d at 447; General, 367 Md. at 487 n.8, 789 A.2d at 109 
n.8 (quoting Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216–17, 571 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1990)) (discussing the 
―some evidence‖ requirement for generating an instruction).  
 160. General, 367 Md. at 486–87, 789 A.2d at 108–09.  See also supra notes 126–127, 133–
134 and accompanying text.  
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Witriol.pdf 
122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 68:104 
there is also at least some evidence of the witness‘s drug addiction or use, 
may find that he is not required to give an instruction on that witness‘s 
relationship with drugs and its effect on credibility.161  However, the 
General rule may require an instruction in such circumstances, particularly 
if there is insufficient corroborating evidence and a refusal to give an 
instruction would not result in harmless error.162  Nevertheless, the Dickey 
court‘s failure to explicitly approve a drug-addict or drug-user instruction 
substituting ―with care and caution‖ language may result in lower courts 
improperly finding that such an instruction is per se an incorrect statement 
of the law and cannot be given. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the Maryland Court of Appeals appropriately affirmed Dickey‘s 
conviction because the denial of the requested instruction was harmless 
error in the instant case,163 the court failed to provide clear direction to 
lower courts regarding the use of specific instructions addressing testimony 
of drug-addict witnesses.164  The court misapplied two of the three prongs 
of the Maryland Rule 4-325 test by failing to acknowledge that general 
witness credibility instructions do not adequately cover the subject matter 
raised in the requested instruction and by not substituting the ―with caution‖ 
standard in the requested instruction to conduct its analysis.165  The court 
further failed to incorporate the facts of Dickey into its addict-informant 
analysis by not recognizing Price‘s dual status as a drug-addict and a 
witness promised a benefit for testifying.166   
Although the court reached the proper result, it failed to adequately 
instruct lower courts on the extent of a trial judge‘s discretion over giving a 
drug-addict witness jury instruction, including where there is sufficient 
evidence that a witness was under the influence of drugs.167  The court‘s 
holding has particularly negative implications for lower courts in cases 
involving the testimony of a drug-addict eyewitness to an alleged crime 
 
 161. Cf. Dickey, 404 Md. at 192, 207, 946 A.2d at 447, 456 (holding the trial court did not err 
by denying the requested drug-addict instruction even where there was evidence of Price‘s drug 
use).  In Dickey, there was corroborating evidence from three other eyewitnesses.  Id. at 189–91, 
946 A.2d at 446.  However, in the heat of a trial, a judge may not be able to discern this 
distinction.  See, e.g., Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 241–42, 378 A.2d 1104, 1108 (1977) 
(affirming the trial court‘s jury conviction of a defendant for murder based on uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice witness, contrary to the Luery rule disallowing such convictions). 
 162. See Dickey, 404 Md. at 207, 946 A.2d at 456; see also General, 367 Md. at 487, 789 A.2d 
at 109. 
 163. Dickey, 404 Md. at 196, 946 A.2d at 449. 
 164. See supra Part IV.C. 
 165. See supra Part IV.A. 
 166. See supra Part IV.B. 
 167. See supra Part IV.C. 
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where there is little evidence corroborating the testimony.  Due to the 
court‘s holding in Dickey, a trial court faced with these circumstances may 
improperly deny a jury instruction on drug-addict witness credibility when 
it really matters.  The court should have taken a more effective approach by 
clearly upholding the propriety of drug-addict witness instructions while 
recognizing that the failure to give such an instruction in this case was 
harmless error.168 
 
 
 168. See supra Part IV.C. 
